Tuesday, April 13, 2010

Reinventing a beleaguered Indian Army



GROUND ZERO

THE SHRINKING HALO
Lately, the Indian Army's halo has shrunk. Riddled with tales ofcorruption, nepotism, indiscipline and factionalism at the highestlevel, the Army's credibility has been dented. Perhaps notirreparably, but dented nevertheless. Known as a highly disciplinedforce, the Indian Army faces a severe crisis of confidence. Sukhna,unfortunately is now inextricably woven into the lexicon of IndianArmy. Which is a shame. On Sunday in between the IPL double header, Iwas channel surfacing and found myself face to face with Ashutoshgrilling the newchief of Army staff - General V K Singh - a third generation Army officer. Thechannel was IBN 7, one that I never watch and I was pleasantlysurprised by the pace of the interview, General sahib's tone and tenorand his overall no nonsense demeanour. The General was clear that hewon't field posers on the Sukhna land scam, but at the same time made himselfabundantly clear that he will not tolerate any sort of indiscipline. He isworried about the Army's image and its internal health, more sobecause the Army as an institution is different from civil society. Itpractices its own code of conduct, honour and tradition. His messagewas loud and clear - improve the decaying discipline, bring confidenceback into the institution and remove all opacity from the systems andprocesses. Further, he was categorical that the Army has no factions.Incidentally, Singh as GOC Eastern Command had recommended the summarydismissal from service of tainted Military Secretary Lt GeneralAvadesh Prakash. The man allegedly responsible for Sukhnagate. Singhobviously wants to do right. And he has to right many wrongs. Fromeggs to rations, senior officers have been accused to filching stuff.But Singh seemed like the man for the job on IBN 7's Hot Seat.
That is only one facet of the new Army chief's job. He also has to addressissues relating to preparedness, the intense pressures on the force todeal with domestic, read counter insurgency and border strife. He hasto make changes in order to improve the combat capacity andcapability, so that India has a constantly motivated and agile Army.He was rapid in his responses saying that there was no colonial legacyin the Indian Army. But it had learnt lessons from different conflictsand as such evolved a new War Doctrine to watch over the borders atall times. As the man in charge of the sensitive Eastern Commandbefore his elevation, V K Singh dispelled all notions ofencroachments from the Chinese side, saying that in the absence of awell defined border, some transgressions have taken place. At the sametime, he was unequivocal in his assessment that the Indian Army coulddeal with all pressure from China. Officer intake was another issue ofvital importance as a constant erosion in the Army's equity vis a visthe new competitive set has seen it lose its lustre and sheen as asafe haven for quality officers. I was glad I watched this interviewfor it was comforting to know that it is his hand that rocks thecradle. I tried to connect some of the dots in my mind's eye.
I was immediately reminded of two excellent stories written by RajatPandit in ToI. The more recent one was after Air Chief P V Naik'selevation as chairman of chiefs of staff where Pandit expounded onIndia's two and a half front war doctrine. The story went like this:"India's worst-case scenario is a two-frontwar. Add the insurgencies in Kashmir and North-East, and rampantnaxalism in other parts, and it becomes a complex two-and-a-half frontsituation. Even as the top military brass undergoes a changeover, withAir Chief Marshal P V Naik becoming the new chairman of chiefs ofstaff committee on Tuesday and General V K Singh the new Army chief onWednesday, the armed forces feel they have to be prepared to tackleany eventuality on either of the two fronts as well as asymmetricalwarfare in the hinterland. Towards this end, in addition to thewestern front with Pakistan, India is now also concentrating hard onthe long-neglected eastern sector with China to swiftly build`capacities' and `capabilities' in tune with `threat perceptions'."
An earlier story by the same writer in December 2009 had said prettymuch the same thing, but in greater detail: "The Army is now revisingits five-year-old doctrine to effectively meet the challenges of apossible `two-front war' with China and Pakistan, deal with asymmetricand fourth-generation warfare, enhance strategic reach and jointoperations with IAF andNavy. Work on the new war doctrine -- to reflect the reconfiguration ofthreat perceptions and security challenges -- is already underwayunder the aegis of Shimla-based Army Training Command, headed byLt-General A S Lamba, said sources. It comes in the backdrop of the1.13-million strong Army having practised -- through several wargamesover the last five years -- its `pro-active' war strategy to mobilisefast and strike hard to pulverise the enemy. "This `cold startstrategy', under a NBC(nuclear-chemical-biological) overhang, emerged from the `harshlessons' learnt during Operation Parakram, where it took Army's strikeformations almost a month to mobilise at the `border launch pads'after the December 2001 terrorist attack on Parliament. This gaveample opportunity to Pakistan to shoreup its defences as well as adequate time to the internationalcommunity, primarily the US, to intervene. The lack of cleardirectives from the then NDA government only made matters worse. Thestory ended by saying thatapart from analysing the evolving military strategy and doctrines ofChina and Pakistan, the Army is also studying the lessons learnt fromthe US-launched Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001 andOperation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and their relevance to India.
What is worrisome and even irksome is that immediately after Sukhnacomes the whiff of a similar scandal which may well be in the works inMumbai. As DNA's Rajshri Mehta reported on April 2, "Four months afterrecently-retired army chief Gen Deepak Kapoor ordered disciplinaryaction against four generals for granting a no-objection certificate(NOC) to a private developer to set up an educational trust outsidethe corps headquarters in Sukna, West Bengal, the army authoritiesappear to have turned a blind eye in a similar case in Mumbai. Underthe Works of Defence Act, 1903, development within 1,000 metres of adefence establishment needs a defence NOC. The alleged irregularitypertains to the near-complete Adarsh Cooperative Housing Society, a30-storey residential tower located on a prime piece of land — onceknown as Kukri Park — abutting sensitive army and navy establishmentsat the Colaba military station in south Mumbai. Admeasuring 6,000 sqmetres, the building, located next to the Cuffe Parade bus depot,offers a scenic view of the Mumbai coastline." All is clearly not wellwithin the hallowed portals of the Indian Army. And General Singhcertainly has his hands full as he attempts to clean the augeanstables. When the General spoke about the lack of quality officerintake in the Army in his interview to Ashutosh, maybe that is thecentrepiece of the malaise that grips this great establishment. Tokeep up with the Jones's in a rapidly changing economy, certainofficers and gentlemen of the Army are resorting to underhand means.This is at the kernel of the state of disrepair and maybe the SixthPay Commission has partly rectified that. Maybe more needs to be doneas the Army wants to keep economic parity with its competitors incivil society.
Geo strategically and in tactical terms, how does one evaluate theArmy's preparedness against the backdrop of waning discipline andrising corruption? Moreover, what does a SWOT analysis reveal? I foundthis interesting analysis - INDIAN ARMY NEW WAR DOCTRINE ANALYSED byDr. Subhash Kapila.
Here goes:
The Indian Army’s enunciation of a New War doctrine was long overduein the light of India's embattled security environment. The lastIndian war doctrine ‘The COLD START War Doctrine" which was aPakistan-specific war doctrine was formulated nearly five years back.India’s two major adversaries, namely Pakistan and China, have in thelast five years lapsed into stronger adversarial postures. A strategicreview of India’s military postures and plans was certainly called forat this juncture. Pakistan today stands externally and internallybesieged with distinct possibilities of disintegration andTalibanization and its nuclearweapons falling into the hands of Taliban and Al Qaeda. A PakistanArmy so besieged could be tempted to military adventurism againstIndia to divert Pakistani public’s domestic discontent.
China on the Northern peripheries of India has indulged in militarysuppression of discontent in Tibet and Xingjian. In relation to Tibet,China has many India-centric fears, hence the growing adversarialstances on India’s borders with Tibet. On a larger plane, China alongwith its military proxy i.e. Pakistan is intent on keeping Indiaconfined within South Asia confines. Hence, the growing adversarialstances of China towards India. In case of both Pakistan and China,the growing strategic cooperation and military-to-military contacts ofIndia with the United States has generated further strategic disquiet.
Contextually therefore, the Indian Army is well within its rights toformulate plans, doctrines and weapon and equipment acquisition plansto meet the enhanced threat profiles from Pakistan and China.In the last five years, the powers that matter in the global strategiccalculus have viewed India as a regional power and a global power inthe making; consequently, there are expectations that India shouldready itself for a greater strategic reach and out-of area-shoulderingof strategic responsibilities.
Two-Front War Doctrine: This will be the mainstay of India's New WarDoctrine, based on the reality that India should expect and beprepared to effectively meet simultaneous threats from China on theNorthern borders and Pakistan on the Western borders.
India Strategic Reach and Out-of Areas Operations Capabilities: TheNew War Doctrine would incorporate enhancement of India'scapabilities. Both are related to India's aspirations as a regionalpower and a global power.
Tri-Service Operational Synergy: This is a logical top priority focusof India's New War Doctrine. It is analyzed that the New War Doctrineenvisages short and shift military operations. With a nuclear overhangwith both Pakistan and China, the Indian military operations toneutralize the Chinese and Pakistani threats has to be fast pacedfacilitated by a high degree of synergy between the Indian Army,Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force.
Asymmetric Warfare and Sub-Conventional Threats: Focus on OperationalCapabilities to Neutralize Such Threats: Emphasis seems to have beenlaid in the Doctrine because both Pakistan and China can be expectedto use these instruments as force multipliers. India focus on intensefast-paced operations can be slowed down by such threats both inforward areas and rear areas.
Military Technological Dominance Over Adversaries: This encompassesthe entire spectrum of Network-Centric warfare, Information Warfare,Cyber Warfare all integrated to facilitate speedy decision making andexploitation of fleeting tactical opportunities.
Of the five major priority thrusts in the New War Doctrine, the firsttwo are the most significant, the last three thrust areas form anessential part of doctrines of all modern war-fighting.
The New War Doctrine’s enunciation of a “Two-Front War Doctrine” andenhancement of “Strategic Reach and “Out of Area OperationsCapabilities” carry immense political and strategic significance interms of India future strategic directions.
The political significance of the New War Doctrine has to be viewed attwo levels. The first level pertains to India's political relationswith China and Pakistan. The second level pertains to India'sstrategic preparedness and a closer integration between the IndianArmy and the internal security agencies to combat the asymmetricthreats.
Indian Army’s New War Doctrine ordinarily should have not generated somuch interest, as periodic strategic reviews of doctrine are a commonfeature of all major armies. However, in case of India's strategicoutlook and its war doctrine, the global and regional interest is thatmuch more as India moves upthe strategic ladder. Indian Army’s New War Doctrine has appeared inthe public domain in its barest outlines. Yet even within thatrestricted framewor,. Indiahas given ample notice of its strategic directions and doctrinalpriorities.
The message for the China-Pakistan strategic nexus is clear. And thatis, that India is preparing itself adequately to meet theirsimultaneous threats effectively. Defensive timidity is no longergoing to be the Indian hallmark to meet the threats posed. India willpoise itself for offensive-defense which is distinct from militaryadventurism. The message for the international community is that Indiais graduallygearing itself to shoulder regional and extended strategicresponsibilities befitting the stature of an aspiring global power.Such gearing-up is not aimed at military adventurism but to readyitself to shoulder strategic responsibilities as a responsiblestake-holder in regional and global affairs.
Needless to say that Kapila is an international relations and strategic affairsanalyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South AsiaAnalysis Group. Anyway, over to General Singh, for he has his task cutout. The political estbalishment is backing General Singh as he getshis feet wet in waters are very clearly muddied.

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